WASHINGTON, Feb 4, 2026, 14:05 EST
- Bill would direct Commerce Department to set mandatory screening rules for gene synthesis providers
- Measure also calls for a NIST “governance sandbox” and a federal biosecurity oversight review
- Sponsors say rules aim to keep pace with AI-driven DNA design and cheap benchtop tools
Two U.S. senators have introduced a bill that would create new federal rules for the sale of synthetic DNA, pushing gene-synthesis firms to screen customers and orders for genetic sequences that could be used to build dangerous pathogens. (Reuters)
The move lands as DNA design gets easier. Researchers increasingly use artificial intelligence to propose new genetic sequences, and smaller “benchtop” machines can turn digital code into physical material, shrinking the gap between an idea and a vial.
It also reflects a familiar Washington worry: a fast-moving biotech supply chain that can power drug research and crop development, and also be misused, while oversight is split across agencies and mostly voluntary in key areas.
The proposal is titled the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act of 2026. It would require the Commerce Department to write regulations within a year of enactment, and to maintain a federal list of “sequences of concern” that providers must screen against.
Those “covered providers” would include not only labs that synthesize and sell synthetic nucleic acids — the DNA and RNA building blocks of life — but also companies that make or resell equipment for nucleic acid synthesis, including benchtop synthesizers.
The bill sketches a screening system that goes beyond one-off checks. It calls for a way to submit order information in a “privacy-preserving” manner to help detect “split orders,” where an actor breaks up a suspicious request across multiple providers, and it says screening should prioritize sequences capable of creating pathogens with “pandemic potential.” (Senate)
It also leans on compliance tools more common in cybersecurity than biology. The measure would set up a conformity assessment regime with audits and “red teaming,” meaning adversarial tests that try to probe whether screening can be bypassed, and it would allow a provider’s conformity status to be revoked.
Enforcement could carry real money. The bill authorizes civil actions by the U.S. attorney general and statutory damages of up to $500,000 for individuals and $750,000 for non-individuals, with inflation adjustments laid out in the text.
To limit friction for legitimate research, it allows for an expedited review track for certain institutional customers and contemplates exemptions for sequences deemed clearly non-hazardous, based on scientific literature and industry practices.
Another section would set up a “biotechnology governance sandbox” run by Commerce’s standards arm, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to test biosecurity and biosafety tools and explore governance approaches, with annual reporting back to Commerce.
The bill would also direct the head of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to assess federal biosecurity and biosafety oversight within 90 days of enactment, and develop an implementation plan to streamline authorities and address gaps, according to the bill text.
The measure is filed as S.3741 and was introduced by Senator Tom Cotton, with Senator Amy Klobuchar as the lone listed cosponsor, and referred to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Congress.gov records show. (Congress)
Cotton said the legislation was “an important first step towards a comprehensive framework for biosecurity and biosafety,” while Klobuchar said stronger standards were needed so sellers “know who their customers are and how they will use genetic material,” in a joint announcement. The sponsors’ office said the bill was endorsed by groups including the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology and companies such as Twist Bioscience, Integrated DNA Technologies and Ginkgo Bioworks. (Senate)
Lawmakers have been circling the gene-synthesis space on other fronts, including scrutiny of ties to China and proposals to tighten controls on the flow of gene-sequence information, and the new bill would place more of the burden on domestic screening by providers.
But much of the impact would hinge on details that get written later: how Commerce defines the “sequences of concern,” how fast the list can be updated, what data-sharing is required to spot split orders, and what it costs providers to pass audits and adversarial testing without slowing legitimate research.
